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Abstract
We o¤er a policy basis for interpreting, justifying, and designing (3; 3)-political rules, a large class
of collective rules analogous to those governing the selection of papers in peer-reviewed journals, where
each referee chooses to accept, reject, or invite a resubmission of a paper, and an editor aggregates his
own and refereesopinions into one of these three recommendations. We prove that any such rule is a
weighted multicameral rule: a policy is collectively approved at a given level if and only if it is approved
by a minimal number of chambers- the dimension of the rule-, where each chamber evaluates a di¤erent
aspect of the policy using a weighted rule, with each evaluators weight or authority possibly varying
across chambers depending on his area(s) of expertise. Conversely, it is always possible to design a
rule under which a policy is collectively approved at a given level if and only if it meets a certain
number of predened criteria, so that one can set the standards for policies rst, and then design the
rules that justify the passage of policies meeting those standards. These results imply that a given
rule is only suitable for evaluating nite-dimensional policies whose dimension corresponds to that of
the rule, and they provide a rationale for using di¤erent rules to pass di¤erent policies even within
the same organization. We further introduce the concept of compatibility with a rule, and use it to
propose a method to construct integer weights corresponding to evaluatorspossible judgments under
a given rule, which are more intuitive and easier to interpret for policymakers. Our ndings shed light
on multicameralism in political institutions and multi-criteria group decision-making in the rm. We
provide applications to peer review politics, rating systems, and real-world organizations.
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tralized authority, rule suitability and design.
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1 Introduction
Collective organizational rules are central to the governance of countries, collectivities, clubs, and corpo-
rations. They dene the procedure by which collective decisions are made, and contain mechanisms for
how the preferences of di¤erent individuals are aggregated to yield a collective outcome. The simplest
collective rules are weighted rules, where each individual has a certain number of votes (or seats), and a
policy proposal is adopted if and only if the total number of votes it receives surpasses a certain threshold
or quota. In the real world, however, many organizations use more complicated rules to make decisions.
An important class of such rules is the class of (3; 3)-political rules, which are rules analogous to those
governing the selection of papers in peer-reviewed journals, where each referee chooses to accept, reject,
or invite a resubmission of a paper, and an editor aggregates his own and referees opinions into one
of these three recommendations. In this paper, we show that any such rule, no matter its complexity,
can be written as a collection of perfectly complementary weighted rules, which has important policy
implications for the interpretation, design and suitability of collective decision-making mechanisms.
The class of (3; 3)-political rules generalizes well-known classes of rules, including (2; 2)-political rules
under which each voter either supports or opposes a policy proposal, the collective outcome being either
the adoption of the proposal or its failure. These latter rules, which were introduced by von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944), have served as the cornerstone of the analysis of group decision-making in a
broad range of important studies in game theory (e.g., Shapley (1953), Arrow (1963), Peleg (1978, 1984),
Taylor and Zwicker (1999), Ray (2007), Laruelle and Valenciano (2008)), political economy (e.g., Barberà
and Jackson (2006), Brams (1975), Acemoglu et al. (2011)), and corporate governance (e.g., Leech (1988,
2003)). But despite their inuence, scholars have argued that (2; 2)-political rules are restrictive, as more
than two levels of individual and collective approval are generally observed in real-life decisions (Fishburn
(1973), Felsenthal and Machover (1997, 1998), Freixas and Zwicker (2003, 2009), Pongou et al. (2011),
Tchantcho et al. (2008), Rubinstein (1980), Hsiao and Raghavan (1993)). For instance, in most real-
world elections, individuals might vote for or against any of the candidates, or might abstain, a situation
forcelluly brought to scholarly awareness by Felsenthal and Machover (1997, 1998). This compelling
argument partly motivates our focus on more realistic collective decision-making mechanisms such as
(3; 3)-political rules.
In this paper, we o¤er a policy basis for interpreting and designing collective rules. We state our main
ndings and discuss their policy implications.
1. First, we show that any (3; 3)-political rule can be decomposed into a hierarchical system of two
weighted multicameral legislatures: the rst legislature determines whether a proposal should be
collectively approved at the highest level, such as accepting a paper, whereas the second legislature
determines whether it should be collectively approved at the intermediate level, such as inviting
a resubmission of a paper after revision. A proposal that fails in each of the two legislatures is
simply collectively rejected. Each legislature consists of several specialized houses or chambers, and
a policy proposal is adopted if and only if it is approved by each house, with each house using a
weighted rule in that each decision-maker is assigned a (vector) weight that measures his political
inuence in that house, and a proposal passes the vote in that house if and only if the sum of points
representing voters opinions exceeds a predetermined quota. If we denote by d1 the minimum
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number of houses of the rst legislature, and by d2 the minimum number of houses of the second
legislature, we say that the corresponding political rule is of 2-dimension (d1; d2).
A practical implication of such a weighted multicameral representation of a (3; 3)-political rule
is that such a rule can be interpreted as a multi-criteria decision-making rule that explicitly asks
decision-makers to evaluate di¤erent aspects of a proposal to be voted on. Each house evaluates one
aspect, with each decision-makers inuence or authority possibly varying across houses depending
on his area(s) of expertise. Importantly, since di¤erent rules generally have di¤erent dimensions,
it follows that each rule is best suited for evaluating nite-dimensional policies whose dimension
(number of aspects to be evaluated) corresponds to that of the rule, and that not all policies can
be evaluated using the same rule. For instance, a one-dimensional policy such as tax rate should
be evaluated using a di¤erent rule than policies of two or more dimensions.
2. Second, we show that any (3; 3)-political rule can be written as the minimum of a nite number
of (3; 3) "quasi-weighted" political rules (in a sense to be dened). This allows us to introduce the
concept of quasi-dimension of a political rule, which generalizes the traditional concept of political
dimension introduced by Taylor and Zwicker (1993).
3. Third, for any given pair of naturals (d1; d2), one can always design a (3; 3)-political rule of 2-
dimension (d1; d2). This nding has important implications for the design of constitutions that
value the inputs of di¤erent experts for the passage of a nite-dimensional policy. For instance, if
one wants to construct a rule under which a proposal is collectively approved at a given level if
and only if it satises a nite set of criteria, this is always possible. In fact, the number of criteria
determines d1 and d2. One can therefore set the standards for policies rst, and then design the rules
that would justify the passage of policies meeting those standards or criteria. For instance, one can
always design a rule to select the winner of the election of Miss Universe where each contestant is
judged regarding predetermined criteria such as beauty, self-condence and ability to communicate.
This nding theoretically provides a rationale for using di¤erent rules to pass di¤erent policies even
within the same organization.
4. Fourth, based on a newly dened concept of compatibility with a rule, we show that there exist
innitely many weighted multicameral rules that are compatible with a (3; 3)-political rule, and
prove that these rules constitute a topologically open set. Further applying topological concepts,
we propose a method to construct integer weights to record the possible judgments of an expert,
which are more intuitive and much easier to interpret for policymakers who vote on a regular basis.
To illustrate our main ndings, let us consider this "thought" process of selecting a paper for publi-
cation in a journal. Suppose that a paper has two parts, one theoretical and the other empirical. The
editor (E) invites four scholars, two theorists (T1 and T2) and two empiricists (E1 and E2), to evaluate
each aspect of the paper. We imagine a collective decision-making rule dened as follows:
 The paper is accepted if the following two situations both occur:
At least one of the referees with expertise in theory nds that the paper makes a theoretical
contribution, and similarly, at least one of the empirical referees judges the paper to make an
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empirical contribution.
None of the four referees rejects the paper.
 The paper is rejected if it is judged by the two theoretical referees to make no theoretical contribution
or it is judged by the two empirical referees to make no empirical contribution.
 The paper is invited to be resubmitted after revision in all other cases.
If we let C1 = fT1; T2g and C2 = fE1; E2g, we can summarize this (3; 3)-political rule by the following
characteristic function V:
V(X1; X2; X3) =
8>>>><>>>>:
2 (paper is accepted) if jX1 \ Cij = 2 or
jX1 \ Cij and jX2 \ Cij = 1 for any i = 1; 2
0 (paper is rejected) if jX3 \ C1j or jX3 \ C2j = 2
1 (resubmission is invited) otherwise
where (X1; X2; X3) is a vote prole in which X1, X2 and X3 are respectively the sets of evaluators
accepting the paper, inviting a resubmission, and rejecting the paper, and jX1j, for instance, is the
cardinality of X1.
We note that in the example above, the editor could be one of the referees (e.g., E = T1 or E = E1),
and if he has expertise in both aspects of the paper, he could play the role of two referees, which would
allow him to express possibly di¤erent views on the theoretical and empirical contributions of the paper.2
As we can see, the formalization of this rule by its characteristic function V is economical, but a bit
complex. However, we show that it can simply be represented as a pair of weighted two-house legislatures
as in the following table:
Legislature 1 Legislature 2
Theory Empirics Theory Empirics
Referee T1 (2; 1; 0) (0; 0; 0) (2; 1; 0) (0; 0; 0)
Referee T2 (2; 1; 0) (0; 0; 0) (2; 1; 0) (0; 0; 0)
Referee E1 (0; 0; 0) (2; 1; 0) (0; 0; 0) (2; 1; 0)
Referee E2 (0; 0; 0) (2; 1; 0) (0; 0; 0) (2; 1; 0)
Quota 3 3 1 1
The rst legislature (Legislature 1) determines whether the paper will be accepted. In this legislature,
the theoretical contribution of the paper is evaluated in the rst house (called Theory), and its empirical
contribution in the second house (called Empirics). In each house, each voter has a three-component vector
weight corresponding to the three possible judgments of the paper (accept, resubmit paper, reject). In
the rst house, each theoretical referee is assigned a vector weight of (2,1,0), which means that the paper
receives 2 points if accepted by a theoretical referee, 1 point if invited to be revised and resubmitted, and
0 points otherwise. Each empirical referee is assigned a weight vector of (0,0,0), which means that their
opinion on the theoretical aspect of the paper does not count. The paper passes the theoretical test if
2Note that under a di¤erent rule, the editor might have the right to overrule the recommandation of the referees. This
situation correspond to the dictatorial political rule. In general, it is always possible to model a rule under which some
referees have more power than others.
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the sum of points received by the paper after each decision-maker evaluates its theoretical contribution
is at least equal to 3. In the second house, each theoretical referee is assigned a weight vector of (0,0,0),
and each empirical referee a weight vector of (2,1,0), and the paper passes the empirical test if it receives
at least 3 points. So only the empirical referees wield power in the second house. The second legislature
(Legislature 2) determines whether the paper will be invited to be revised and resubmitted. In this
legislature, each evaluator has the same weight as in the rst legislature; however, the paper can be
resubmitted if and only if it receives at least 1 point in each of the two houses. The 2-dimension of this
peer review rule is (2; 2).
Like the characteristic function V, most collective rules or constitutions are unfortunately simply
dened as a distribution of voting power among the di¤erent subgroups of voters. In general, there is no
rationale for the nature of policies that can be evaluated under these rules, which are also silent on the
precise role of each voter in making decisions. A decomposition such as the one performed for V, however,
addresses those shortcomings, as it shows that V is best suited for the evaluation of two-dimensional policy
proposals, where each dimension is evaluated using a weighted rule. It also clearly describes the weight
given to the opinion of each voter along each dimension. Such an approach further suggests a transparent
and policy-driven method to design rules. Indeed, instead of dening a rule by its characteristic function
as it is usually done, one can simply x the number of criteria to be met by a policy to be collectively
adopted under such a rule, and dene a weighted rule for each criterion, which is a simple exercise. Such
a method would clearly value the opinion of experts, as the weight given to the judgment of a voter can
be made to vary across the di¤erent dimensions.
Given that the class of (3; 3)-political rules generalizes well-known classes of rules, including (2; 2)-
political rules, (3; 2)-political rules, and (2,3)-political rules, our ndings extend to these latter classes of
collective mechanisms as well. Within our framework, (2; 2)-political rules and (3; 2)-political rules have
2-dimension (or simply dimension) (m; 0), where m is a natural number at least equal to 1. A well-known
example of such a rule is the procedure to revise the Canadian Constitution (Kilgour (1983), Taylor and
Zwicker (1999)). Under this procedure, a proposal to amend the Canadian Constitution becomes law
only if it is approved by at least seven of the ten Canadian provinces, subject to the proviso that the
approving provinces constitute at least half of Canadas population. Thus, this voting rule, which can
be shown to be of dimension (2,0), assigns two weights to each province, with the rst representing the
vote cast on the proposal by the province, and the second representing its population share. The case
where m = 1 represents the well-known class of weighted voting rules. These rules are the most appealing
way of modelling voting power inequality in an assembly where each member retains a certain number of
votes. Our analysis implies that such rules are most appropriate for evaluating one-dimensional policies.
In addition to generalizing well-known classes of political rules, our nding that (3; 3)-political rules
can be viewed as systems of weighted multicameral legislatures provides a rationale for multicameral-
ism in political institutions (Rowley and Schneider (2004), Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Bräuninger
(2003)), and multi-criteria decision-making in market organizations. Multicameralism better captures
the complexity of the notion of representation by its ability to aggregate diverse interests. The greater
the number of houses, the greater the probability of the legislature to provide multiple perspectives on
an issue, as our ndings imply. Under multicameralism, representatives sharing a common interest are
usually grouped in the same committee. Some interesting examples are: the Westminster system in
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Britain with two houses (the house of Lords and the house of the commons), the South Africas apartheid
government in 1983 with three race-based houses (White, Colored, Asians), the Medieval Scandinavian
deliberative assemblies with four houses (the nobility, the clergy, the burghers, and the peasants), and
the Council of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) with four houses, each representing the interest
of a specic group of agents (consumers, investors, producers of minerals, developing countries and some
other countries).3 Similarly, a rms decision is sometimes determined by the di¤erent opinions expressed
by its di¤erent departments as discussed in Baucells and Sarin (2003). In this case, a department (e.g.,
the marketing or the R&D department) plays the role of a specialized house.
Our paper also generalizes classical results on multicameral representation of (2; 2)-political rules
(Taylor and Zwicker (1992, 1993, 1999)). Taylor and Zwicker were the rst to show that these latter rules
have a weighted multicameral representation. They also introduced the algebraic notion of dimension,
and argued that it is a "measure of the complexity" of a voting mechanism. They further showed that
there exists a (2; 2)-political rule of any given dimension. The concept of dimension has served as the
cornerstone of many subsequent studies extending Taylor and Zwickers results (see, e.g., Freixas and
Puente (2008), Deineko and Woeginger (2006)). Laruelle and Valenciano (2011) extend the concept of
dimension to voting rules allowing four inputs not necessarily ranked, and two possible collective outputs.
It follows from these studies that the focus has mainly been on rules that yield only two possible
collective outcomes such as passing or failing a bill. However, many real-world group decisions are not
binary. Our thought example of the process of selecting papers in a journal is a point in case. But
there are other examples. A winner of a beauty contest may be the queen, the rst runner-up, or the
second runner-up. Hierarchy in the victory is also encountered in many sport competitions where the
winners can receive the gold, silver, or bronze medal based upon judgesallotment of scores. Similarly,
in a legislative assembly, a bill may pass or fail, or the decision on its passage may be adjourned, which
might be a desired outcome for certain legislators who still have to make their mind. Freixas and Zwicker
(2003) have proposed a model of games with multiple inputs and outputs that capture such situations.
In addition to generalizing the literature by focusing on rules with more than two inputs and outputs,
our analysis yields new theoretical ndings that have important policy implications for the interpretation
and design of political rules. Following basic denitions in Section 2, we show that a (3; 3)-political rule
is a hierarchical system of two legislatures in Section 3. Building on this result, in Section 4, we introduce
two new theories of dimension, namely the concepts of 2-dimension and quasi-dimension, which fully
capture the complexity of (3; 3)-political rules. These theories imply that most constitutions are implicit
multi-criteria decision-making rules under which each voter can be seen as an expert who has the ability
to judge of the pertinence of a proposal only in his area(s) of expertise. We also show that one can always
design a decision-making rule that values the views of specialized experts, and that is only suited for
the evaluation of policies of a given dimension. In section 5, we introduce the concept of compatibility
with a rule, and show that every (3; 3)-political rule has a weighted multicameral representation with
integer weights and quotas. Our proofs are new. Section 6 provides some applications to real-world
organizations, and Section 7 concludes.
3Note, however, that the fact that like-minded representatives are often grouped in the same chamber under multicam-
eralism might lead to strategic voting, as shown by Dewan and Spriling (2011) with respect to the Westminster system.
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2 Preliminary Denitions
N = f1; 2; :::; ng is a non-empty set of evaluators, players, or voters. Subsets of N are coalitions. For any
nite set S, we denote by jSj the number of elements of S.
Voters are invited to vote on a proposal a. Each voter may vote for or against a, or may express an
intermediate level of approval such as abstaining.4 We denote by X1 the set of voters who vote for, X2
the set of voters who express the intermediate of approval, and X3 the set of voters who vote against.
We call X = (X1; X2; X3) a tripartition of N or a vote prole, and we denote by N3 the set of all vote
proles of N .
2.1 (3; 3)-Political Rules
A (3; 3)-political rule is a pair (N;V) where V is a function that maps each vote prole of N into one of
three possible collective outcomes in the set f0; 1; 2g. 2 means that the proposal voted on is collectively
accepted, 1 means that it is adjourned, and 0 means that it is rejected. When no confusion is possible,
V will be used for (N;V).
(3; 3)-political rules might have di¤erent applications and interpretations depending on the context.
In a legislature, a legislator might support or oppose a policy proposal or abstain, and the latter might
pass, fail, or be adjourned. In the academic peer review context where each evaluator recommends either
acceptance, rejection, or resubmission of a paper (the intermediate level of approval), the nal collective
outcome is usually one of these three recommendations. In the context of the comprehensive examination
of Ph.D. candidates in the United States, a student can pass the exam both at the Master and Ph.D.
levels, fail the exam both at the Master and Ph.D. levels, or pass the exam only at the Master level.
Two special classes of (3; 3)-political rules are the classes of (3; 2)-political rules and (2; 2)-political
rules. Under a (3; 2)-political rule, voters have three options, but there are only two possible collective
outcomes, such as adopting or failing a proposal. Under a (2; 2)-political rule, voters have only two
options, such as supporting or opposing a measure, and the collective outcome is either the adoption or
the failure of the measure.
This paper uses the standard denition of a (3; 2)-political rule as a rule that maps each vote prole
of N into one of two possible collective outcomes in the set f0; 1g. In this case, 0 means the proposal has
failed, and 1 means the proposal is accepted.
2.2 Monotonicity
One of the most intuitive properties of political rules is the monotonicity property. A (3; 3)-political rule
is monotonic if any increase in an individuals level of support for a proposal, ceteris paribus, cannot
decrease the collectivitys su¤rage for that proposal. To be more specic, let us consider two vote proles
X and Y on a proposal a. We say that X is a sub-tripartition of Y or Y is a super-tripartition of X (
and we write X 3 Y ) to convey that each voters level of support for a is weakly greater in Y than X.
Formaly, X is a sub-tripartition of Y if either X = Y or X can be transformed into Y by moving one
or more voters to a higher level of approval, everything else being equal. On the other hand, if X is a
sub-tripartition of Y , distinct to Y , we write X 3 Y .
4The intermediate level of approval has several interpretations depending on the context, as we will see in Section 2.1.
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We dene Xj " as the set of the voters who choose a level of approval higher than j , which means
X1 "= X1, X2 "= X1 [X2, and X3 "= X1 [X2 [X3 .
We say that a (3; 3)-political rule V is monotonic if for any vote proles X, Y such that X is a
sub-partition of Y , V(X)V(Y ). This means that if X can make a proposal approved at a given level,
so does Y . This is because voters have weakly higher level of support for the proposal in Y than in X.
2.3 Minimal Winning and Maximal Losing Vote Proles
As stated earlier, a (3; 2)-political rule G = (N;V) is a voting rule with only two possible outcomes
(such as accepting or rejecting a proposal). Vote proles that lead to the approval of the proposal are
called winning vote proles or winning tripartitions ( V(X) = 1), and those that lead to the rejection
of the proposal are losing vote proles or losing tripartitions (V(X) = 0). A vote prole X is said to
be minimal winning if every sub-tripartition of X is losing, and X is said to be maximal losing if every
super-tripartition of X is winning.
2.4 Monotonic Weighted Multicameral (3; 3)-Political Rules
In the following, we provide a denition of a weighted multicameral (3; 3)-political rule. Intuitively, a
multicameral voting rule is a rule under which the vote takes place simultaneously in a set of houses or
chambers, here denoted by C. As more restrictive conditions should be fullled to shift a proposal to a
higher level of approval, we split C into two disjoint sets of houses C1 and C2, where each set of houses
constitutes a legislature. C2 represents the set of all the houses that must approve the proposal for it to
earn the second level of collective approval. However, to earn the highest level of approval, the proposal
should be approved in the additional number of houses that constitute C1. Let d be the total number of
houses (d = jCj). We use the letters i to index the d houses, and j to index the levels of approval of a voter
( 1  i  d and 1  j  3). Each house i is characterized by a quota qi; each legislator p in house i has
a three-component vector weight wi(p) = (wi1(p); wi2(p); wi3(p)), meaning that the number of additional
points credited to a proposal in that house is wi1(p) when p votes for it, wi2(p) when p abstains, and
wi3(p) when p votes against it5; a proposal is approved in house i if the sum of points credited to it after
everybody has voted is at least equal to the quota qi. Our formal denition is below.
Denition 1 Let G = (N;V) be (3; 3)-political rule. A weighted multicameral representation of G is a
list (C1; C2; w; q) that satises the three following conditions:
(1) A vote prole X leads to the highest level of collective approval of a proposal if and only if the
proposal is approved in all the voting chambers (V(X) = 2 if and only if wi(X)  qi for every house i in
C1 [ C2, where wi(X) =
P fP fwij(p)jp 2 Xjg j1  j  3g is the sum of points credited to the proposal
in house i after each voter has chosen a level of support, resulting in X).
(2) A vote prole X leads to the intermediate level of collective approval of a proposal if and only
if the proposal is approved in all the chambers of C2, but is rejected in at least one of the chambers of
C1 (V(X) = 1 if and only if there is a house i in C1 such that wi(X) < qi and for every house i in C2,
wi(X)  qi).
5For instance, in the example in the introduction, the vector weights for theoretical referees and empirical referees in
the Theory house are respectively: wTheory(T1) = wTheory(T2) = (2; 1; 0), and wTheory(E1) = wTheory(E2) = (2; 1; 0). In
Legislature 1, the quota in the Theory house is qTheory = 3.
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(3) A vote prole X leads to the collective rejection of a proposal if and only if the proposal is rejected
in at least one of the chambers of C2 (V(X) = 0 if and only if there is a house i in C2 such that wi(X) < qi).
The table describing the peer review system in the introduction is a simple illustrative example of the
denition of a weighted multicameral (3; 3)-political rule. In that example, while the sets of houses in
the two legislatures are the same (C1 = C2 = fTheory;Empiricsg), this is not always the case in general.
Similarly, while the vector weight of a voter does not vary across the two legislatures in that example, a
voters vector weight does vary across legislatures in general.
A political rule is said to be a weighted multicameral political rule if it has a weighted multicameral
representation. Note that C1 = ; corresponds to the particular case of weighted multicameral (3; 2)-
political rules. If additionnally, C2 has only one house, the corresponding (3; 2)-political rule is said
to be weighted. We will say that a (3; 3)-political rule G is weighted when the decision criteria are
unidimensional, which means both C1 and C2 are singletons.
Under a weighted multicameral political rule, a voters weight associated with a given level of approval
might vary across houses, which implies that a voter may be more inuential in certain houses than others,
as illustrated in the example in the introduction. In each legislature, each theoretical referee has a greater
weight in the Theory house than in the Empirics house. Similarly, each empirical referee has a greater
weight in the Empirics house than in the Theory house. A house in which a voter has a high level of
inuence may be viewed as the house dealing with matters on which that voter is an expert. We therefore
think of houses as being specialized, and of voters as experts who have decentralized authority and vote
only on specic aspects of a proposal under consideration.
3 A (3; 3)-Political Rule as a Hierarchical System of Legislatures
In this section, we show that a (3; 3)-political rule can be viewed as a hierarchical system of legislatures,
with each using a (3; 2)-political rule. More precisely, we show that voting under a (3; 3)-political rule G
is equivalent to voting simultaneously under two (3; 2)-political rules G1 and G2. The rule G1 determines
whether the proposal should be granted the highest level of approval while the rule G2 decides whether
or not the proposal should be granted the intermediate level of approval. The formal result is as follows:
Remark 1 Let G = (N;V) be a (3; 3)-political rule. Recall that a (3; 2)-political rule is entirely charac-
terized by the set of all its winning vote proles. Dene the (3; 2)-political rules V1 and V2 as follows: for
every vote prole X, (V1(X) = 1 if and only if V(X) = 2 ) and (V2(X) = 1 if and only if V(X) 2 f2; 1g).
This means V1 considers as winning vote proles only those that lead to the highest level of collective
approval of a proposal, whereas the winning vote proles of V2 are those that lead to the approval level at
least equal to the intermediate level.
The decomposition of V as given in Remark 1 yields a unique pair of (3; 2)-political rules (V1;V2) 6.
We write V = V1 ?V2 and we say that V1 ?V2 is a (3; 2)-decomposition of V or V is a (3; 3)-composition of
V1 and V2. V1 is of a higher standard than V2 in the sense that it is more di¢ cult for a policy proposal to
6Mathematically, V1 and V2 satisfy V = V1 + V2.
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pass under V1 than under V2 holding votersopinions xed7. We say that the pair (V1;V2) is ordered8.
The following theorem summarizes the point just made:
Theorem 1 Every (3; 3)-political rule has a unique (3; 2)-decomposition.
Remark 1 proves Theorem 1 by establishing a one-to-one mapping between the set of (3; 3)-political
rules V and the set of ordered pairs (V1;V2) of (3; 2)-political rules.
One of the implications of Theorem 1 is that some of the properties of (3; 2)-political rules can be
extend to the class of (3; 3)-political rules using the (3; 2)-decomposition of (3; 3)-political rules.
The following result provides a necessary and su¢ cient condition for a (3; 3)-political rule to be
weighted.
Proposition 1 Let G = (N;V) be a (3; 3)-politcal rule and V1 ? V2 the (3; 2)-decomposition of V. V is
weighted if and only if V1 and V2 are weighted (3; 2)-political rules.
The proof of this result is constructed as follows: given a weighted (3; 3)-political rule V, from the
weights of V, we construct the weights of the two weighted (3; 2)-political rules that compose V. Con-
versely, if the weights of V1 and V2 are known, we show how to retrieve a system of weights for the rule
V1 ? V2. See Appendix A for a formal proof.
Consider a pair of weighted (3; 2)-political rules (V1, V2). If (V1, V2) is ordered, then the weighted
(3; 3)-political rule V1 + V2 = V1 ? V2 is said to be a weighted (3; 3)-political rule. However, when (V1,
V2) is not ordered, the (3; 3)-political rule G1 +G2 is not necessarily weighted. In this case, we said that
V1 + V2 is a quasi-weighted (3; 3)-political rule.
We can notice that a weighted (3; 3)-political rule is quasi-weighted although the converse is not
necessarily true. Moreover, the notion of quasi-weighted rule coincides on the class of (3; 2)-political rules
with the concept of weighted rule. Any weighted (3; 2)-political rule can be viewed as a (3; 2)-composition
of two weighted political rules V1 and V2 where V = V1 and V2 is the trivial political rule which considers
any vote prole as winning.
4 New Theories of Dimension
Previous studies have characterized voting rules using the traditional concept of dimension introduced
by Taylor and Zwicker (1993). They show that any monotonic (2; 2)-political rule has a weighted multi-
cameral representation with a minimal number of houses called dimension. Intuitively, the dimension of
a monotonic (2; 2)-political rule can be interpreted as the minimum number of houses that must accept a
proposal in order for it to be adopted by the collectivity. This concept, however, does not apply to rules
with more than two levels of collective approval, as the outcome of the rule can no longer be formulated
as accepting or rejecting a proposal. Under a (3; 3)-political rule, a proposal can be approved at two
levels, the highest level and the intermediate level, the third level being its rejection. It seems reasonable
7Notice that V1  V2 since V1(X)  V2(X) for any vote prole X.
8 In general, decomposing a (3; 3)-political rule G as V1 + V2 does not necessarily provide a (3; 2)-decomposition of G. A
necessary and su¢ cient condition for V1+V2 to be a (3; 2)-decomposition of G is that the pair (V1;V2) be ordered. We can
also notice that the decomposition V1 + V2 preserves monotonicity in the sense that if G is monotonic, then V1 and V2 are
monotonic too. Conversely we can verify that if V1 and V2 are monotonic, then V1 + V2 is monotonic.
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to require that the rst two levels of approval be incorporated in the denition of the dimension of a
monotonic (3; 3)-political rule, which we do in this section. To this e¤ect, we introduce the concept of
quasi-dimension and that of 2-dimension.
4.1 The Quasi-Dimension of a (3; 3)-Political Rule
Earlier studies have shown that a (2; 2)-political rule is a nite intersection of weighted (2; 2)-political
rules (intersection should be understood as minimum). According to Taylor and Zwicker (1993), the
dimension of a (2; 2)-political rule G is dened as the minimum integer m such that G can be written as
the minimum ofm weighted (2; 2)-political rules. In the following, we represent a (3; 3)-political rule as the
minimum of a nite number of quasi-weighted (3; 3)-political rules. We then dene the quasi-dimension
of a (3; 3)-political rule G as the minimum number of quasi-weighted (3; 3)-political rules necessary to
construct G. A formal denition of the quasi-dimension of a (3; 3)-political rule is provided below:
Denition 2 The quasi-dimension of a (3; 3)-political rule G is the minimum integer m such that G can
be written as the minimum of m quasi-weighted (3; 3)-political rules but cannot be written as the minimum
of m  1 quasi-weighted (3; 3)-political rules.
The above denition is an extension of the concept of dimension as dened on the class of (2; 2)-
political rules. In the following, we therefore generalize some results obtained for (2; 2)-political rules.
Theorem 2 Every monotonic (3; 3)-political rule has a weighted multicameral representation and can be
written as the minimum of a nite number of (monotonic) quasi-weighted (3; 3)-political rules.
The proof of this theorem is Appendix B. First, we show that every monotonic (3; 2)-political rule
has a multicameral representation and is the minimum of a nite number of weighted (3; 2)-political rules
(the dimension of a (3; 2)-political rule cannot exceed the number of maximal losing vote proles). Then
we propose a method to construct a multicameral representation of the (3; 3)-political rule G from the
system of weights of the (3; 2)-political rules that compose G. Finally we show that the sub-political rules
that compose G are (3; 3)-quasi-weighted political rules.
The following result establishes that the concept of quasi-dimension is well dened on the class of
monotonic (3; 3)-political rules.
Proposition 2 Every monotonic (3; 3)-political rule has nite quasi-dimension.
The proof of this result is straightforward given Theorem 2.
4.2 The 2-Dimension of a (3; 3)-Political Rule
We introduce the concept of 2-dimension of a monotonic (3; 3)-political rule. It is a vector (d1; d2) 2
N  N [ f0g where d1 is the minimum number of houses that must accept a proposal in order for it to
be collectively approved at the highest level, and d2 the minimum number of houses that must accept a
proposal in order for it to be collectively approved at the intermediate level. Below, we provide a formal
denition of the concept of 2-dimension.
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Denition 3 Let G = (N;V) be a monotonic (3; 3)-political rule and V1 ? V2 the (3; 2)-decomposition of
V. The 2-dimension of V is the vector (d1; d2) where d1 and d2 are respectively the dimensions of V1 and
V2.
We note that the notion of 2-dimension generalizes the traditional notion of dimension since the
two concepts coincide on the class of (3; 2)-political rules and (2; 2)-political rules. Indeed, a monotonic
(3; 2)-political rule of dimension d can be seen as having 2-dimension (d; 0).
The following theorem establishes that the concept of 2-dimension is well dened on the class of
monotonic (3; 3)-political rules.
Theorem 3 The 2-dimension of a monotonic (3; 3)-political rule always exists.
If one assumes that one-dimensional policies should be evaluated using weighted (or one-dimensional)
rules, from a policy perspective, Theorem 3 implies that a given monotonic (3; 3)-political rule is only
suited for the evaluation of nite-dimensional policies whose dimension corresponds to that of the rule,
with each aspect of the policy being evaluated in a di¤erent house or chamber using a weighted rule. The
fact that any such rule has a weighted multicameral representation also implies that any (3; 3)-political
rule is a collection of perfectly complementary weighted rules in the sense that a policy proposal cannot be
approved at a given level if it is not approved under each of the weighted rules of the legislature deciding
on the approval of the proposal at that level (in fact, the rule used in each legislature is a minimum
of weighted rules, which means that if a policy proposal fails under one of these rules thus yielding an
outcome of zero for that rule, the minimum will therefore be zero, and so the proposal will fail overall in
that legislature).
We also have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Let m be a positive integer. There always exists a monotonic (3; 2)-political rule of
dimension m (or 2-dimension (m; 0)).
We now prove that there exists a monotonic (3; 3)-political rule of any 2-dimension.
Theorem 4 Let d1 and d2 be two positive integers. There exists a monotonic (3; 3)-political rule of
2-dimension (d1; d2).
Proposition 3 and Theorem 4 imply that one can always design a (3; 3)-political rule for evaluating a
policy that has to meet a set of d1 criteria to be approved at the highest level and a set of d2 criteria to be
approved at the intermediate level, where the d2 criteria in the second set altogether are somewhat weaker
than the d1 criteria in the rst set so that a policy that satises the rst set of criteria automatically
satises the second set, while the converse is not true in general. This means that one can set the criteria
for policies rst, and then design the rules that rationalize the passage of policies meeting those criteria.
This result also provides a rationale for using di¤erent rules to evaluate di¤erent policies, even within the
same organization.
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5 Useful Topology of Political Rules for Policymakers
In this section, we introduce the concept of compatibility with a rule, which we subsequently use to show
that any (3; 3)-political rule has a weighted multicameral representation in which weights and quotas are
integers. Weights therefore represent the number of votes, which facilitates the interpretation of political
rules for policymakers.
5.1 Compatibility
We introduce the concept of compatibility of a real vector with a rule, and topologically characterize
the set of weighted multicameral rules that are compatible with a given political rule. We rst establish
our results on the class of (3; 2)-political rules, then extend them to the class of (3; 3)-political rules.
Before dening the concept of compatibility, recall that any weighted multicameral representation of a
rule ' = (wij(p); qi)1id;1j3;1pn can be viewed as a vector of Rd(3n+1) (see Appendix F for the
vector conguration). We have the following denition.
Denition 4 Let G = (N;V) be a (3; 2)-political rule and ' = (wij(p); qi) 2 Rd(3n+1) a weighted
multicameral representation of G.
' is V- compatible if for every vote prole X, the following two conditions are satised:
(1) X is winning if and only if the weight of X in every house i is strictly higher than the corresponding
quota qi (V(X) = 1 if and only if wi(X) > qi for all 1  i  d).
(2) X is losing if and only if the weight of X is strictly lower than the quota in at least one house,
and is always distinct from the quota in every house. (V(X) = 0 if and only if wi(X) < qi for some i
and wi(X) 6= qi for all i).
We show that the set of weighted multicameral representations of V that are V-compatible is an open
set.
Theorem 5 Let G = (N;V) be a (3; 2)-political rule. The set of weighted multicameral representations
of V that are V-compatible is an open set of Rd(3n+1).
This result is proved by showing that the set of weighted multicameral representations of V, ' =
(wij(p); qi) 2 Rd(3n+1), that are V-compatible is the intersection of two open subsets of Rd(3n+1).
The immediate implication of this result is that all the properties of open sets of Rd(3n+1) can
be applied to the set of V-compatible weighted multicameral representations of the (3; 2)-political rule
G. For instance, if a weighted multicameral representation of a (3; 2)-political rule is subject to some
su¢ ciently small pertubations, the distribution of political power will remain unchanged. This nding
will prove important in the next section where we show that any (3; 3)-political rule has a weighted
multicameral representation whose weights and quotas are integers, and propose a method to construct
such a representation.
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5.2 Integer Weights and Quotas
We show that any (3; 3)-political rule has a weighted multicameral representation in which weights and
quota are integers. Such a representation is more intuitive, as it implies that the weights wij(p) can
now be interpreted as the number of votes held by voter p in the house i when he chooses the level
of approval j. Such an interpretation is also more likely to be understood by policymakers, lawmakers
and shareholders who vote on a regular basis, and to shed light on the real structure of power in an
organization.
Theorem 6 Let G = (N;V) be a (3; 3)-political rule. G has a weighted multicameral representation
whose weights and quotas are integers.
This result implies that one can always represent any (3; 3)-political rule in a way that is understand-
able to any policymaker. An example is our example in the introduction where all weights and quotas
are integers. See Section 6 for other examples as well.
We now extend below the concept of the weight monotonicity requirement introduced by Freixas and
Zwicker (2003) for single-house rules. It says that the higher the level of approval of a voter for a given
proposal, the higher should be his contribution to make that proposal approved by the society.
Denition 5 Let G = (N;V) be a monotonic (3; 3)-political rule. A weighted multicameral representation
(w; q) of G satises the "weight monotonicity requirement" if :
for every voter p 2 N and for every 1  i  d; wi1(p)  wi2(p)  wi3(p).
We show below that any (3; 3)-political rule admits a weighted multicameral representation that
satises the weight-monotonicity requirement.
Theorem 7 Any (3; 3)-political rule has a weighted multicameral representation that satises the weight-
monotonocity requirement.
6 Applications
In this section, we apply our theoretical ndings to some real-life organizations. For each organization,
we dene its decision-making rule and provide a weighted multicameral representation of that rule with
integer weights and quotas, and satisfying the weight-monotonicity requirement.
6.1 The Council of the International Seabed Authority
The International Seabed Authority is an intergovernmental organization created in 1994 to monitor
mineral-related activities in the international seabed territories outside of states regulated jurisdiction.
The ISA has two principal organs: an assembly, which consists of all the ISA members, and a 36-member
council, elected by the assembly. The council members are chosen to ensure equitable representation
of countries from various groups. As described by Bräuninger (2003), the members of the council are
distributed into four houses denoted C1; C2; C3; C4 as follows:
C1 : four states elected from among the largest consumers of the minerals in question
C2 : four states elected from among the largest investors in deep-sea mining
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C3 : four states from among the largest net exporters
C4 : six developing countries and eighteen additional states to ensure a balanced geographical distri-
bution of seats in the council.
In the ISA council, a decision on most issues requires a two-thirds majority approval of its members
on the proviso that such decision is not opposed by a majority in any of the four houses. This voting rule
can be modeled as a (3; 2)-political rule G = (N;V) as follows:
For any vote prole X = (X1; X2; X3),
V(X) = 1 if and only if
(
jX1j  24
jX3 \ Ctj < 12 jCtj ; 1  t  4
This decision-making rule was studied by Bräuninger (2003), who proved that it is not of dimension
one. In the following, we propose a weighted multicameral representation of the vote within the Council of
ISA . In the matrix of weights below, the rst, the second , the third and the fourth columns represent the
house of consumers, investors, exporters and the fourth house, respectively. The last column represents
the entire council.
C1 C2 C3 C4 Council
w(consumer) (3; 2; 1) (0; 0; 0) (0; 0; 0) (0; 0; 0) (1; 0; 0)
w(investor) (0; 0; 0) (3; 2; 1) (0; 0; 0) (0; 0; 0) (1; 0; 0))
w(exporter) (0; 0; 0) (0; 0; 0) (3; 2; 1) (0; 0; 0) (1; 0; 0)
w(others) (0; 0; 0) (0; 0; 0) (0; 0; 0) (2; 2; 1) (1; 0; 0)
Quota 1 1 1 10 24
The vote in the ISA council is a monotonic (3; 2)-political rule of dimension 5 (the 2-dimension is
(5; 0) and the quasi-dimension is 5).
6.2 A Voting Rule in the United States Senate
We study the voting rule for electing the Vice-President of the United States when the Electoral College
fails to do so. We show that the quasi-dimension of this rule is 1.
When electing the Vice-President of the U.S., if no candidate receives the majority of the electoral
votes, the Senate chooses between the two candidates with the highest number of votes in the Electoral
College. The U.S. Senate consists of 100 Senators and the current Vice-President. The voting rule is
the absolute majority rule and does not explicitly specify the outcome of the rule if neither candidate
receives 51 votes. Let a and b be the two candidates with the highest number of electoral votes. This
voting mechanism can be modeled as a monotonic (3; 3)-political rule G = (N;V) as follows. For every
vote prole X = (X1; X2; X3), let X1, X2, X3 represent the set of voters who vote for a, abstain, and
vote for b, respectively. The three possible outcomes of the vote are: a wins, the vote is inconclusive, b
wins. The following model of this voting rule was proposed by Taylor and Zwicker (2003):
V(X1; X2; X3) =
8><>:
a if jX1j  51
inconclusive if jX1j < 51 and jX3j < 51
b if jX3j  51
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We argue that the quasi-dimension of this rule is 1 and its 2-dimension is (1; 1). Let G1 and G2 be
two monotonic (3; 2)-political rules dened as follows:
V1(X1; X2; X3) = 1 if and only if jX1j  51
V2(X1; X2; X3) = 1 if and only if (jX1j  51) or (jX1j < 51 and jX3j < 51)
A weighted representation of G1 and G2 is respectively given by:
Rule G1 Rule G2
w(Senator) (1; 0; 0) (1; 1; 0)
w(Vice-President) (1; 0; 0) (1; 1; 0)
Quota 51 51
Both G1 and G2 are of dimension 1. Since G1 and G2 provide a (3; 2)-decomposition of G, the
quasi-dimension of G is 1 and the 2-dimension of G is (1; 1).
6.3 Core Examination of Graduate Students in United States Universities
In some U.S. universities, Masters students have two options when completing their Mastersdegree.
They can either write a thesis or take an exam. Students who choose the exam option are pooled
with Ph.D. candidates to write a core examination. The core examination usually combines several
subjects. Suppose that the core examination in a department of Economics is based on three subjects:
microeconomics, macroeconomics and econometrics.
Assume that the core examination committee consists of 6 members divided into 3 subcommittees as
follows: the microeconomics committee (2 members), the macroeconomics committee (2 members), and
the econometrics committee (2 members).
To each student taking the core examination, each committee member assigns three decisions cor-
responding to their judgment on the students performance on each of the three subjects. There are
three possible decisions for each subject: pass, marginal pass, and fail. There are also three possible nal
outcomes for each student. A student can pass the exam both at the Master and Ph.D. levels, pass the
exam only at the Master level, or fail the exam both at the Master and Ph.D. levels. Passing the core
examination at a given level requires obtaining a certain grade on each subject. Assume that a student
must have at least one "pass" and one "marginal pass" to pass a subject at the Ph.D. level, and at least
two "marginal pass" or one "pass" to pass a subject at the Masters level.
The above described rule is a monotonic (3; 3)-political rule. We denote the examination outcomes
as follows: 2 = Ph.D., 1 = Master, 0 = fail. For any vote prole X = (X1; X2; X3), X1, X2 and X3
are respectively the set of professors who vote "pass", "marginal pass" and "fail". Denote by C1, C2,
C3 the microeconomics committee, the macroeconomics committee, and the econometrics committee,
respectively. On a given subject, only the corresponding subcommittee has the full competence to judge
the performance of a student. Therefore, we assume that the decisions of the members outside of a
subcommittee do not a¤ect the studentsoutcome for that subject. The above described core examination
can be modeled as a (3; 3)-political rule G = (N;V) as follows:




Ph.D. if (jX1 \ Ctj = 2 or (jX1 \ Ctj = 1 and jX2 \ Ctj = 1) for all 1  t  3
Master if (jX2 \ Ctj = 2) or (jX1 \ Ctj = 1) for all 1  t  3
Fail if 91  t  3; (jX3 \ Ctj  1) and (jX1 \ Ctj = 0).
Let G1 (resp. G2 ) be the monotonic (3; 2)-political rule that determines whether a student will pass
the core examination at the Ph.D. (resp. at least at the Master level ). G1 and G2 can be dened as
follows: for any vote prole X = (X1; X2; X3),
V1(X) = 1 if and only if V(X) = Ph:D:
V2(X) = 1 if and only if V(X) 2 fPh:D:;Masterg
The weighted representations of G1 and G2 are given by:
Rule G1 Rule G2
C1 C2 C3 C1 C2 C3
w(microeconomist) (2; 1; 0) (0; 0; 0) (0; 0; 0) (2; 1; 0) (0; 0; 0) (0; 0; 0)
w(macroeconomist) (0; 0; 0) (2; 1; 0) (0; 0; 0) (0; 0; 0) (2; 1; 0) (0; 0; 0)
w(econometrician) (0; 0; 0) (0; 0; 0) (2; 1; 0) (0; 0; 0) (0; 0; 0) (2; 1; 0)
Quota 3 3 3 2 2 2
Therefore, both G1 and G2 are of dimension 3. Since G1 and G2 provide a decomposition of G as in
Remark 1, the 2-dimension of G is (3; 3).
One might want to modify the examination system to avoid situations where Mastersstudents are
evaluated on econometrics as is the case in certain universities. Assume, for example, that every student is
now required to have at least two "marginal pass" outcomes to pass microeconomics and macroeconomics.
Ph.D. students are required to have one "pass" or one "marginal pass" to pass econometrics. The modied
rule has the following weighted multicameral representation:
Rule G1 Rule G2
C1 C2 C3 C1 C2
w(microeconomist) (3; 2; 0) (0; 0; 0) (0; 0; 0) (3; 2; 0) (0; 0; 0)
w(macroeconomist) (0; 0; 0) (3; 2; 0)) (0; 0; 0) (0; 0; 0) (3; 2; 0)
w(econometrician) (0; 0; 0) (0; 0; 0) (2; 1; 0) (0; 0; 0) (0; 0; 0)
Quota 4 4 3 4 4
G1 and G2 are respectively of dimension 3 and 2, and the 2-dimension of G is (3; 2).
7 Concluding Remarks
We have provided a policy basis for rationalizing, that is, interpreting, justifying and designing (3; 3)-
political rules, a large class of collective organizational rules analogous to those governing the selection
of papers in a peer-reviewed journal. The di¤erent examples investigated in the paper show that such
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rules can be extremely complex. Yet, we have shown that any such rule, no matter its complexity, is
a hierarchical system of two weighted multicameral legislatures: the rst legislature determines whether
a proposal should be granted the highest level of collective approval, such as accepting a paper, and
the second legislature determines whether it should only be approved at the intermediate level, such as
inviting a resubmission. Such a representation is a very convenient way of modelling complex decision-
making rules. It also allows us to view any (3; 3)-political rule as a multi-criteria decision-making rule
under which decision-makers rate di¤erent aspects of a nite-dimensional proposal, where each aspect
is evaluated in a di¤erent specialized house using a weighted voting rule, and each evaluators inuence
or weight possibly varies across houses depending on his area(s) of expertise. Evaluators therefore have
decentralized authority, and each is seen as an expert in a particular area.
We have also shown that it is always possible to design a (3; 3)-political rule of any given 2-dimension.
Practically, this nding implies that it is always possible to design a rule under which a proposal is
collectively approved at a given level if and only if it satises a certain number of "predened criteria",
so that one can set the criteria for policies rst, and then design the rules that rationalize the passage
of policies meeting those criteria. This shows that rules can be designed so as to be suitable only for
the evaluation of certain policies, and suggests a rationale for using di¤erent rules to pass di¤erent
policies. Accordingly, a unidimensional policy should be evaluated using a (3; 3)-political rule that has
only one house in each legislature, since only one aspect of the policy will be evaluated. However, multi-
dimensional policy proposals should be evaluated under weighted multicameral legislatures, where each
house examines one aspect of the policy, and each legislator is given more weight in the house evaluating
the aspect that pertains to his area of expertise. We note that a legislator may be expert in many areas,
in which case he should have inuence in di¤erent houses.
Designing a collective rule based on a set of criteria to be met by an ideal policy is not only transparent,
but practical. Indeed, it might be cumbersome to try to write a decision-making rule as we did in our
example in the introduction. A simpler way of writing the same rule would be to consider the matrix
of weights, which clearly show how much inuence each evaluator wields along a given criterion. If one
wants to change the rule at some point, perhaps because one wants to increase the standards of policies
to be adopted, or because one wants to get more evaluators involved along each criterion, one can simply
modify the weights and/or the quotas, which is simple (although this might not be so easy in practice).
For instance, one might change the weight matrix of the two legislatures in that example as follows:
Original Rule Modied Rule
Theory Empirics Theory Empirics
Referee T1 (2; 1; 0) (0; 0; 0) (2; 1; 0) (1; 0; 0)
Referee T2 (2; 1; 0) (0; 0; 0) (2; 1; 0) (1; 0; 0)
Referee E1 (0; 0; 0) (2; 1; 0) (1; 0; 0) (2; 1; 0)
Referee E2 (0; 0; 0) (2; 1; 0) (1; 0; 0) (2; 1; 0)
Quota for Legislature 1 3 3 5 5
Quota for Legislature 2 1 1 3 3
We note that under the modied rule, it is harder to get a paper accepted, or considered for resub-
mission, compared to the original rule. Under the modied rule, while experts still have more power in
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their area of expertise, their only opinion is no longer su¢ cient to determine that a paper passes the
test in their area. For instance, while under the rst rule, the coalition of theoretical referees fT1; T2g
has dictatorial power on acceptance along the theoretical dimension, it only has a veto right under the
modied rule. Similarly, as regarding the empirical assessment of the paper, the coalition of empirical
referees fE1; E2g has only a veto right for acceptance under the modied rule, whereas they had dicta-
torial power under the rst rule. However, each expert still has a veto right along his area of expertise
since the paper cannot get accepted (even after revision) without him strongly backing the decision.
These two rules might also be used by two di¤erent journals or organizations. One lesson to be
learned here is that writing such a rule explicitly, as we did in the introduction, could be very confusing
in some instances and could subject the written rule to di¤erent interpretations. Similarly, writing the
characteristic function of a rule may not let policymakers know whether the rule is really appropriate for
evaluating a given proposal, and it may not be explicit on the precise role of each evaluator. The table,
on the contrary, clearly shows the power structure among the di¤erent evaluators along each dimension
of a potential proposal, and should therefore be preferred to a written rule. It also shows that the original
and the modied rules are most appropriate for the evaluation of two-dimensional policies.
We have also proposed two new concepts of dimension (the quasi-dimension and the 2-dimension),
and have shown that they generalize the literature. While the traditional theory is easily interpreted
within our framework, we show that the 2-dimension measure does not only capture the number of
possible outputs yielded by a (3; 3)-political rule, but it also takes into account the hierarchy in these
outputs. Furthermore, we have introduced the concept of compatibility of a vector with a rule, which
we have used to show that there exist innitely many weighted rules that are strictly compatible with a
(3; 3)-political rule, and that these rules form a topologically open set. We have also proposed a method
to construct integer weights and quotas, which are more intuitive, more relevant for rule design and
policy-making, and more transparent for policymakers. In sum, our results rationalize multicameralism
in real-world organizations and multi-criteria group decision-making in market organizations (Baucells




Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
If G is weighted, then fwij ; i 2 C1g and fwij ; i 2 C2g are the systems of weights of G1 and G2, respectively.
Conversely, if fw1jg1j3 and fw2jg1j3 are respectively the systems of weights of the weighted rules
G1 and G2, dene the system of weights of G, fwijg, as wij = w1j if i 2 C1 and wij = w2j if i 2 C2 with
C1 = f1g and C2 = f2g.
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 2
The following lemma is needed to prove our result.
Lemma 1 Any monotonic (3; 2)-political rule has a weighted multicameral representation. More pre-
cisely, every monotonic (3; 2)-political rule can be written as the minimum of a nite number of weighted
(3; 2)-political rules.
Proof :Let G = (N;V) be a monotonic (3; 2)-political rule and (Y 1; :::; Y d) the list of all the maximal
losing tripartitions (or vote proles) of N . For every voter p 2 N , dene the matrix of the weights of p
as follows:
for all 1  i  d and for all 1  j  3; wij(p) =
(
0 if p 2 Y ij "
1 otherwise:
The quota for each house i is qi = 1; 1  i  d
We have:
V(X) = 1 i¤ for all 1  i  d; X *3 Y i
i¤ for all 1  i  d; there exists 1  j  3, Xj "* Y ij "
i¤ for all 1  i  d, there exist 1  j  3 and p 2 Xj " such that p =2 Y ij "
i¤ for all 1  i  d, there exist 1  j  3 and p 2 Xj " such that wij(p) = 1
i¤ for all 1  i  d; wi(X)  qi:
Therefore, w = (wij)1id;1j3 and q = (qi)1id dene a weighted multicameral representation of
G.
For each 1  i  d, let Gi = (N;Vi) be the (monotonic) weighted (3; 2)-political rule represented by
(wij ; qi). It can be easily shown that for every X 2 N3, V(X) = min fVi(X); 1  i  dg.
Proof of Theorem 2 Let G = (N;V) be a (monotonic) (3; 3)-political rule and V1 ? V2 the (3; 2)-
decomposition of G (see Proposition 1). Following Lemma 1, V1 and V2 can respectively be decomposed
as the minimum of a nite number of weighted (3; 2)-political rules fV1i g1i d1 and fV2i0g1i0 d2 . For
every 1  r  2 , 1  i  d1 or 1  i  d2, let wri = (wrij)1j3 be the matrix functions of votersweights
in the rule Vri , and qri the quota of Vri . Dene C1 = f1; :::; d1g, C2 = fd1 + 1; :::; d1 + d2g, and w and q as




w1ij(p) if i 2 C1
w2i d1j(p) if i 2 C2
qi =
(
q1i if i 2 C1
q2i d1 if i 2 C2
For every vote prole X 2 N3:
V(X) = 2 () V1(X) = 1 and V2(X) = 1
() V1i (X) = 1 and V2i (X) = 1; 8 1  i  d1; 1  i  d2
() wi(X)  qi; 8 i 2 C1 [ C2:
V(X) = 1 () V1(X) = 0 and V2(X) = 1:
() 9 1  i  d1; V1i (X) = 0 and V2i0(X) = 1; 81  i0  d2
() minfV1i (X) + V2i0(X); 1  i  d1; 1  i0  d2:
V(X) = 0 () V1(X) = 0 and V2(X) = 0
() 9 1  i  d1; 1  i  d2;V1i (X) = 0 and V2i (X) = 0
() 9 i 2 C2; wi(X) < qi
Futhermore, each V1i + V2i0 is a quasi-weighted (3; 3)-political rule, and it is easy to show that V =
minfV1i + V2i0 ; 1  i  d1; 1  i0  d2g .
Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 3
The (3; 2)-decomposition of a monotonic (3; 3)-political rule as described in Remark 1 yields a unique pair
of monotonic (3; 2)-political rules. Since the notion of dimension is well-dened on the class of monotonic
(3; 2)-political rules (following Lemma 1), the 2-dimension of any monotonic (3; 3)-political rule always
exists.
Appendix D : Proof of Proposition 3
Let m be a positive integer and N = f1; 2; :::; 2mg. Dene a monotonic (3; 2)-political rule G = (N;V)
by: for every vote prole X = (X1; X2; X3),
V(X) = 1 i¤X1 \ f2i  1; 2ig 6= ;; 81  i  m.
Below is a two-step proof that the dimension of the above-described monotonic (3; 2)-political rule is
m.
Step 1 : First, we show that G is a minimum of m weighted monotonic (3; 2)-political rules.
For 1  i  m, let Gi = (N;Vi) be the weighted monotonic (3; 2)-political rule represented by
(wij ; qi)1j3 dened as follows: for every p 2 N ,
wij(p) =
(




Let X 2 N3 be a winning vote prole.
X 2 V 1f1g i¤ X1 \ f2i  1; 2ig 6= ;, for all 1  i  m
i¤ there is p 2 N such that wij(p) = 1, for all 1  i  m
i¤ wi(X)  qi, for all 1  i  m
i¤ X 2 V 1i f1g , 81  i  m
i¤ X 2 \V 1i f1g j 1  i  m	.
Thus V 1f1g = \V 1i f1g j 1  i  m	.
step 2: Our next goal is to show that G is not the minimum of m   1 weighted monotonic (3; 2)-
political rules. Assume on the contrary that G can be written as the minimum of m   1 weighted
monotonic (3; 2)-political rules G
0





For every 1  i  m , dene Y i = (N   f2i  1; 2ig ; f2i  1; 2ig ; ;):
Each Y i is a losing vote prole of G. Therefore, we can pick one of the m   1 weighted monotonic
(3; 2)-political rules in which Y i has a weight less than the quota of that monotonic (3; 2)-political rule.
By the pigeonhole principle, we can assume without losing generality that we have a similar weighted
monotonic (3; 2)-political rule G
0
t that makes both Y
1 and Y 2 losing vote proles.
Let X1 and X2 be two vote proles dened as follows:
X1 = (N   f2; 3g ; f2; 3g ; ;) and X2 = (N   f1; 4g ; f1; 4g ; ;).
Since X1 and X2 (resp. Y 1 and Y 2 ) are two winning (resp. losing) vote proles of the monotonic
(3; 2)-political rule G
0



























2). Therefore, it is impossible to
write G as the minimum of m  1 monotonic (3; 2)-political rules.
Appendix E : Proof of Theorem 4
Let N = f1; 2; :::; 2d1; 2d1 + 1; :::; 2d1 + 2d2g. Dene the monotonic (3; 3)-political rule G = (N;V) by:
for every vote prole X = (X1; X2; X3),
V(X) = 2 i¤ (8 1  i  d1; 8 1  i0  d2 X1 \ f2i  1; 2ig 6= ;) and (X1 \ f2d1 + 2i0   1; 2d1 + 2i0g 6= ;)
V(X) = 1 i¤ (9 1  i  d1; X1 \ f2i  1; 2ig = ;) and (X1 \ f2d1 + 2i0   1; 2d1 + 2i0g 6= ;; 8 1  i0  d2)
V(X) = 0 i¤ (9 1  i  d1; 9 1  i0  d2; X1 \ f2i  1; 2ig = ;) and (X1 \ f2d1 + 2i0   1; 2d1 + 2i0g = ;)
Let G1 = (N;V1) and G2 = (N;V2) be two monotonic (3; 2)-political rules dened as: for every vote
prole X = (X1; X2; X3),
V1(X) = 1 i¤ X1 \ f2i  1; 2ig 6= ; 81  i  d1.
V2(X) = 1 i¤ X1 \ f2d1 + 2i0   1; 2d1 + 2i0g 6= ; 8 1  i0  d2.
The method used to construct G1 and G2 is the same as the one used in the proof of Theorem
3. Therefore, the monotonic (3; 2)-political rules G1 and G2 are respectively of dimension d1 and d2.
Furthermore, G1 ? G2 is the (3; 2)-decomposition of G. This allows us to conclude that the 2-dimension
of G is (d1; d2).
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Appendix F : Conguration of the Matrix of Weights of a Multicameral Rule as a
Vector of Rd(3n+1)
Let u and v be two positive integers. It is always possible to dene a one-to-one function between the
set Muv(R) of all the u  v real matrices and Ruv. Consider the one-to-one function f dened from
Md(3n+1)(R) to Rd(3n+1) that maps the matrix w = (wi;j(p); qi)1id;1j3;1pn to the vector f(w)
dened by:
f(w) = (w11(1); w12(1); w13(1); :::; w11(n); w12(n); w13(n); q1; :::;
wd1(1); wd2(1); wd3(1); :::; wd1(n); wd2(n); wd3(n); qd).
f allows to view a weighted multicameral representation of a (3; 2)-political rule rule as a vector of
Rd(3n+1).
Appendix G: Proof of Theorem 5
Dene the sets UG and VG as follows:
UG = \fUX , X is a winning vote proleg where: UX =

' 2 Rd(3n+1) = wi(X) > qi, 8 1  i  d
	
:
VG = \fVX , X is a losing vote proleg where: VX = f' 2 Rd(3n+1)=91  i  d;wi(X) < qig:
The following two lemmas are needed to establish our result.
Lemma 2 Let G = (N;V) be a (3; 2)-political rule. The sets UG and VG are open sets of Rd(3n+1).
Proof: For any vote prole X, dene:
hX : Rd(3n+1)  ! Rd
' = (wij(p); qi) 7 ! (wi(X)  qi)1id
The function hX is well-dened and continuous.
Let us show that UG is an open set of Rd(3n+1).
UX is an open set of Rd(3n+1) because UX is the inverse image of an open subset of Rd by the
continuous function hX , as shown below:
UX =





' 2 Rd(3n+1) = hX(') 2]0;+1[d
	
= h 1X (]0;+1[d).
UG is the intersection of a nite number of open sets of Rd(3n+1). Therefore UG is an open set of
Rd(3n+1).
Now, let us show that VX is an open subset of Rd(3n+1).
For every ' 2 VX , write: d1' = jfi; wi(X) > qigj and d2' = jfi; wi(X) < qigj. Notice that hX(') 2
V' where V' is the cartesian product of d1' sets ]0;+1[ and d2' sets ]   1; 0[: V' is an open set of
Rd(3n+1). Furthermore,
VX = f' 2 Rd(3n+1) j hX(') 2 V'g
= [fh 1X (V'); ' 2 VXg:
VX is a union of open sets of Rd(3n+1), which implies that VX is an open set of Rd(3n+1). Since VG
is the intersection of a nite number of open sets of Rd(3n+1), VG is an open set of Rd(3n+1).
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Lemma 3 Let G = (N;V) be a (3; 2)-political rule. The set  (G) of all the vectors ' 2 Rd(3n+1) that
are V-compatible is the intersection of UG and VG.
Proof: Let ' 2 Rd(3n+1) a vector that is V-compatible and X a vote prole of N .
If X is a winning vote prole, then wi(X) > qi for all 1  i  d. Therefore ' 2 UX . This implies that
' 2 UG = \fUX ; X winning vote prole g
If X is a losing vote prole, then there exists 1  i  d such that wi(X) < qi . Therefore ' 2 VX .
This implies that ' 2 VG = \fVX ; X losing vote proleg.
Therefore,  (G) is the intersection of UG and VG.
Now, we can proof our main result.
Proof of Theorem 5: Because   (G) can be decomposed as an intersection of open sets of Rd(3n+1)
(Lemma 3),   (G) is an open set of Rd(3n+1).
Appendix H: Proof of Theorem 6
To proof our main result, we will need the following lemmas that are also interesting on their own.
Lemma 4 Let G = (N;V) be a (3; 2)-political rule. If ' = (wij(p); qi) 2 Rd(3n+1) is a weighted
multicameral representation of G, then there exists q
0 2 Rd such that '0 = (wij(p); q0i) is V-compatible.
Proof : Dene i as the lower bound of the set fwi(X)= wi(X)  qi; X 2 N3g and i as the upper bound
of the set fwi(X)= wi(X) < qi; X 2 N3g. Notice that i < qi  i. Dene q0i = i+i2 and consider a
vote prole X.
If X is a winning vote prole, then wi(X)  i > q0i; for all 1  i  d.





i) is V-compatible .
It follows that a V-compatible vector can be obtained from a weighted multicameral representation of a
(3; 2)-political rule G. Altering the weights of voters is unnecessary. A judicious alteration of the quotas
of G is su¢ cient. A corollary to the previous lemma is the following.
Corollary 1 Let G be a (3; 2)-political rule. G is a weighted multicameral rule if and only if there exists
' 2 Rd(3n+1) that is V-compatible.
Lemma 5 Let G be a (3; 2)-political rule. G has a weighted multicameral representation if and only if
there exists ' 2 Qd(3n+1) that is V-compatible.
Proof : If G has a weighted multicameral representation, then   (G) is a nonempty open subset of
Rd(3n+1) (Theorem 5). The denseness of Qd(3n+1) in Rd(3n+1) yields a ' 2   (G) \ Qd(3n+1). The
converse is trivial.
Lemma 6 Let G be (3; 2)-political rule. G has a weighted multicameral representation if and only if there
exists ' 2 Zd(3n+1) that is V-compatible.
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Proof : If G has a weighted multicameral representation, then   (G) \Qd(3n+1) 6= ; (Lemma 5).
Pick  = (aij(p)bij(p) ;
ci
di
) 2   (G) \ Qd(3n+1) where (bij(p); di) 2 Nd(3n+1). Let  be the least common
multiple of the set fbij(p); dig1id;1j3;1pn and ' = . It readily follows that ' 2   (G)\Zd(3n+1).
The converse is trivial.
Proof of Theorem 6
Let G1 ? G2 the (3; 2)-decomposition of a (3; 3)-political rule G. The monotonicity of G insures
the monotonicity of G1 and G2. We can nd weighted multicameral representations of G1 and G2 with
integer weights and quotas (Lemma 6). Use these systems of weights to construct a weighted multicameral
representation of G with integer weights and quotas . For the method of construction, see the proof of
Proposition 2.
Appendix I: Proof of Theorem 7
Let w = (wij ; qi)1id;1j3 be a weighted multicameral representation of G that violates the weight-
monotonocity requirement. This implies there is a voter x 2 N and a house t such that wtl(x) < wtl+1(x),
with 1  t  d; 1  l  2.
Construct the new weighted multicameral representation u of G as follows:
uij(p) =
8><>:
wtl+1(p) if p = x; i = t and j = l
wtl(p) if p = x; i = t and j = l + 1
wij(p) otherwise:
We want to show that both u and w identically distribute the elements of N3 into the group of winning
and losing vote proles. Let X be any vote prole with x 2 Xl+1 and Y the vote prole derived from X
by shifting voter x to Xl: We see that:
1. X V Y (by monotonicity), and for every 1  i  d , wi(X) > wi(Y ):
2. ui(X) = wi(Y ) and ui(Y ) = wi(X):
Therefore, for every 1  i  d, wi(X)  qi if and only if wi(Y )  qi (from (1)), which happens if and
only if ui(X)  qi (from (2)).
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